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We develop a general framework for parameter estimation that allows only trusted parties to ac-
cess the result and achieves optimal precision. The protocols are designed such that adversaries can
access some information indeterministically, but only at the risk of getting caught (cheat-sensitivity);
under the assumption that the adversary can access the channel only once, then the protocol is un-
conditionally secure. By combining techniques from quantum cryptography and quantum metrology,
we devise cryptographic procedures for single parameter estimation when an arbitrary number of
parties are involved.
INTRODUCTION
Classical protocols for sharing measurement results,
e.g. secret location sharing [1–4], use classical encryp-
tion schemes that rely on assumptions such as a bounded
computational capacity of the adversaries. Quantum
cryptography [5–7] instead promises unconditional secu-
rity: the only assumptions are the laws of physics, and
a correct implementation. Here we introduce a general
framework for quantum cryptographic protocols specif-
ically suited to the task of securing measurement out-
comes (parameter estimation) while retaining the highest
available precision allowed by quantum mechanics (quan-
tum metrology). Clearly, one could perform optimal pa-
rameter estimation and then use conventional quantum
cryptographic protocols to securely transmit the result.
As we show here, thanks to the quantum nature of the
states employed in quantum metrology, simple modifica-
tions of conventional quantum metrology protocols allow
secure transmission of the estimated parameter. While a
few such schemes have appeared in the literature [8–12],
they were suited only to specific cases. Here we give a
general framework that can be adapted to any quantum
metrology protocol, which can be turned into a quantum-
secured one with the prescriptions given below. For sub-
shot-noise estimation security here is intended as cheat-
sensitivity [13, 14]: adversaries can access information
but only at the risk of being caught. This security model
is appropriate only for situations in which the penalty of
being caught is higher than the payoff of siphoning some
information. The presented protocols can also achieve
unconditional security under the hypothesis that Eve can
interact with the probes only once.
Our goal is to securely and optimally estimate an ar-
bitrary parameter ϕ, encoded onto a probe through a
unitary operator Uϕ = e
−iϕH , where H is a known Her-
mitian operator, in an ideal noiseless scenario.
In our framework, a trusted party, Charlie, holds the
black box which encodes the unitary Uϕ. He can switch
between implementing Uϕ+pim/N and Upim/N , where m ∈
{0, .., N − 1} (we will see later on why this is needed).
Charlie does not need to know ϕ: he just has to add an
additional phase in the first case and reroute the probes
in the second. Charlie can classically communicate with
the other trusted parties (Alice, Bob), but cannot pre-
pare quantum states. Charlie can be a sensor at a remote
location where the trusted parties do not have easy ac-
cess, e.g. a small device which collects data at a remote
location, and has limited experimental capabilities.
As is customary, we allow the eavesdropper Eve com-
plete control of the channel where the probes travel. The
main idea is simple: in quantum metrology the measure-
ment probes are prepared in an entangled state (e.g. the
NOON state) which has the feature that separate mea-
surements on each probe give no information on the pa-
rameter until they are jointly processed, because of the
entanglement. Moreover, a test of correlations on a com-
plementary observable of the probes can test for the pres-
ence of Eve as in conventional quantum cryptography:
any action by Eve will ruin the correlation in at least
one of two complementary properties. If she is detected,
the protocol is terminated. For example, in the secret
estimation of distance between two parties [8–12] H and
ϕ represent the energy and the time of arrival of the
probes respectively, which are the two complementary
observables that must be tested to exclude the presence
of Eve.
The optimality of the parameter estimation is achieved
through quantum metrology [15–18]. It establishes the
best precision attainable in terms of the resources de-
voted to it: if one is allowed N uses of the transforma-
tion Uϕ, one can at most achieve the Heisenberg limit
scaling of 1/N2 in the variance (both in the finite di-
mensional [17] and in the infinite dimensional [19, 20]
cases). Among the strategies to achieve the Heisenberg
limit [17, 21] here we use (i) the sequential scheme where
the map Uϕ acts on one probe N times and (ii) the par-
allel entangled-scheme where an entangled state of N
probes goes through N maps Uϕ in parallel (see Fig. 1).
In the latter case, entanglement among the N probes is
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2necessary, whereas separable states can only achieve the
standard quantum limit scaling of 1/N [17].
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FIG. 1. A strategy which achieve the Heisenberg limit: the
parallel-entangled strategy: a state of N probes goes through
N maps in parallel. The channel Uϕ encodes the parameter
to be estimated onto the probe states. The channels are also
subjected to possible manipulation by an eavesdropper, Eve,
denoted by the shaded regions.
The outline of the paper follows. In the first section,
we summarize the key results of quantum metrology, then
detail how it can be turned into cryptographic protocols
involving one, two or an arbitrary number of parties.
Quantum metrology deals with the optimal estimation
of a parameter ϕ which is encoded into a probe by a uni-
tary map Uϕ = exp[−iHϕ], where H is the Hermitian
generator. The optimal initial states of the probe are the
ones that have a maximum spread for the generator: for
the parallel-entangled strategy an optimal state for the
N probes is the NOON state (|λm〉⊗N + |λM 〉⊗N )/
√
2,
where |λm〉 , |λM 〉 are the eigenvectors of H correspond-
ing to the minimum and maximum eigenvalues [17,
22]. After the evolution, the state is transformed into
eiNϕλm |λm〉⊗N + eiNϕλM |λM 〉⊗N and can be measured
ith the observable O+N = (Oˆ
+)⊗N , with O± = (|λm〉 ±
|λM 〉)/
√
2. The observable has an expectation value
cos[Nϕ(λM−λm)], whence one can estimate the parame-
ter ϕ. After repeating the estimation procedure ν times,
the error in the estimation asymptotically in ν attains
the inequality [17]
∆ϕ2 ≥ 1/ν[N(λM − λm)]2, (1)
which corresponds to the Heisenberg limit. However, us-
ing purely N-probe NOON states only allows the phase to
be estimated modulo 2pi/N because there are N fringes
in 2pi. To resolve this ambiguity, smaller NOON states
with N = 1, 2, 4... also have to be used, adding a small
overhead to the precision in Eq. (1) [23–25].
SINGLE PARTY SECURE ESTIMATION
Transforming a metrology protocol into a quantum
cryptographically secure one is simple in the one-party
scenario, where a single party (Alice) is in charge both
of the preparation and measurement.
The protocol is designed such that Eve cannot extract
information on ϕ or bias the measurement results without
risking being caught (cheat sensitivity), even if she is
in charge of the channel between Alice and the maps
Uϕ. Namely, we assign Eve the possibility of performing
arbitrary joint transformations on the probes both after
Alice’s preparation and before Alice’s measurement. If
Eve biases the measurement by applying an additional
phase Uθ, θ 6= 0, she needs to be discovered.
The cryptographic protocol requires Alice to choose
randomly to prepare the phase-sensitive states |Ψ±N 〉,
each with probability Pa/2, and eigenstates of the Hamil-
tonian {|λ0〉 , |λ1〉} each with probability (1 − Pa)/2,
where
|Ψ±N 〉 = 1/
√
2(|λm〉⊗N ± |λM 〉⊗N ) (2)
|λ0〉 = |λm〉⊗N (3)
|λ1〉 = |λM 〉⊗N . (4)
Alice sends through the probes one by one (there can-
not be more than one probe in the channel at any one
time), and only sends the next after the previous one
returns1 Charlie keeps count of the number of probes go-
ing through the devices, and if there are too many many
probes, it means that Eve is sending some of her own and
they abort the protocol. On each entire state that Alice
sends, he chooses to randomly implement Uϕ+pim/N and
Umpi/N with probabilities Pc and (1− Pc) respectively.
Whenever Alice prepares |λ0/1〉, or when Charlie ap-
plies Umpi/N and Alice had prepared |Ψ±N 〉, Alice will end
up with a decoy state. Here the term “decoy” denotes
a state that is not encoded with the parameter ϕ, which
can be used to implement security checks. If she wants
the complementary sets of decoy states to occur with
equal probabilities, she chooses Pa(2− Pc) = 1 (see sup-
plementary material).
If Alice had prepared |Ψ+N 〉 or |Ψ−N 〉, after the Uϕ inter-
actions, she measures the observable Oˆ+N or Oˆ
−
N respec-
tively, separately on each of the |Ψ±N 〉. Instead, when
she had prepared |λ0〉 , |λ1〉, she performs a projective
measurement back onto this basis. If she had prepared
|Ψ±N 〉 and finds that the measurement does not match
the preparation, she informs Charlie, which will in turn
reveal whether he applied the check Umpi/N . Projecting
a probe state back onto the NOON basis remains deter-
ministic, since
Umpi/N |Ψ±N 〉 =
{
|Ψ±N 〉 , if m is even,
|Ψ∓N 〉 , if m is odd.
(5)
From the states which Charlie has applied the check uni-
tary, they can deduce whether Eve has biased the mea-
surement.
1For large N , if Alice sends the entire state through all at once, then
Eve can easily estimate the phase unitary herself, apply her guess
to Alice’s state and send it back to Alice; here Eve will get away
with much greater probability.
3Now, we design the protocol such that the channel is
a dephasing one if m is unknown. This can be achieved
by Charlie implementing Uϕ+mpi/N with random m ∈
[0, .., N − 1]. If we limit m (say m = 0, 1), then Eve
could be using single qubits instead of a N00N state to
get an estimate. For large N , pi/N becomes small. If
Eve replaces Alice’s probes with her own and she knows
the value of N, then if she sees anything other than the
identity or pi/N , she will know Charlie may have applied
the parameter and gain a decent estimate on ϕ.
For both the check cases, the outcomes are determin-
istic. If the measurement outcome does not match the
state preparation/evolution, Alice knows Eve has been
tampering and the protocol is terminated, or they can
estimate Eve’s bias.
As the last step in the protocol, if the check shows that
the process has been noiseless, only then Charlie reveals
on which probes he applied which unitary, i.e. the value
of m in Uϕ+pim/N . Alice then computes the observable
〈Oˆ+N 〉 + 〈Oˆ−N 〉 = cos[(Nϕ + mpi)(λM − λm)], whence she
obtains ϕ. All the public communication is useless to a
third party.
Asymptotically, the achievable root-mean-square error
is ∆ϕ2 ≥ 1/PaPcν[N(λM − λm)]2, because with proba-
bility Pc Charlie applies Umpi/N .
With probability P = 1 − PaPc, Alice would have a
decoy state at hand, and if Eve tampers with the esti-
mation, she will be discovered with probability (1− P4 )κ,
where κ is the number of states she tampers with.
Eve cannot gain information on ϕ deterministically -
to estimate ϕ, Eve needs to have hijacked Alice’s probes
whilst the phase unitary is applied, and not having been
caught previously. If she is discovered, Charlie keeps the
value of m to himself, and Eve estimates ϕ+pim/N with
an unknown m, which is useless.
The maximum QFI Eve gains is κN2, where κ is the
number of probe states she tampers with, and this occurs
with exponentially small probability (Pc)
κ.
Note that, if Eve cannot access the channel twice
(and can only attempt to recover ϕ by measuring Al-
ice’s probes), then the protocol is unconditionally secure,
since from her point of view the state propagating in the
channel is a mixed state,
[(|λm〉〈λm|)⊗N + (|λM 〉〈λM |)⊗N ]/2 , (6)
which is useless for parameter estimation since it does
not acquire any phase during the interaction Uϕ.
MULTIPLE-PARTY ESTIMATION
In two-party protocols Alice is in charge of the state
preparation and Bob is responsible for the measurements
(e.g. a distance measurement using light pulses and syn-
chronized clocks). They both wish to recover the pa-
rameter in a way that is at least cheat-sensitive. The
procedure is inspired by the BB84 protocol.
The state preparation is the same as for the single
party protocol: Alice chooses randomly to prepare |Ψ±N 〉
each with probability Pa/2, and |λ0/1〉 each with proba-
bility (1−Pa)/2. Bob independently chooses to measure
either Oˆ+N with probability (1−Pa)/(1−PaPc), or a pro-
jective measurement onto {|λ0〉 , |λ1〉}, with probability
1−(1−Pa)/(1−PaPc) (this makes the probability of the
decoy states symmetric, see supplementary material).
Whenever Alice has prepared |λ0/1〉, Charlie has ap-
plied the check unitary and Bob has measured in the
correct basis, namely, when the states Bob received are
|Ψ±N 〉 , |λ0/1〉, the outcomes are deterministic. After Bob’s
measurement, they use a public channel to check their
choice of measurement basis and discard all the cases
when they do not agree (see Fig. 2).
The exchange of classical information can be done at
the end of the protocol, follows:
1. Alice reveals the basis of state preparation, Alice
and Bob check for correlations on |λ0/1〉. If the
correlations are perfect, they proceed.
2. Charlie reveals on which states he has applied the
check unitary Umpi/N .
3. On the states Charlie has applied the check uni-
taries, Alice reveals which of the |Ψ±N 〉 she pre-
pared, and they check correlations in this basis as in
Eq. (5). If they decided that no one has tampered
with the communication, Charlie discloses the val-
ues of m on the states which he applied Uϕ+pimN .
4. Alice reveals on half the probe states whether she
prepared |Ψ+N 〉 or |Ψ−N 〉, and Bob reveals his mea-
surement outcomes on the other half.
They now can compute Oˆ±N correspondingly, where
the sum of the expectation values is once again
cos[(Nϕ+mpi)(λM − λm)], whence they can both obtain
ϕ. Four states are necessary for the two-party proto-
col, because alternating between the plus or minus probe
state ensures that their communication is meaningless to
a third party.
The probability of Eve being undetected is (see Sup-
plementary Material)(
1− 2(1− Pa)Pa(1− Pc)
4(1− PaPc)
)κ
. (7)
This can be improved if Alice and Bob share a secret
bit string in advance such that Bob knows which basis
to choose, in which case Eve’s probability of being un-
detected is (1 − 1−PaPc4 )κ. In addition, if Eve only has
access to one end of the channel, then she cannot gain
any information, even if she intercepts all the probes and
the communication between Alice and Bob.
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FIG. 2. Alice sends either |Ψ±N 〉 or |λ0/1〉 into the quan-
tum channel which encodes the parameter ϕ onto the probes.
Charlie implements the unitary Ux, x ∈ {ϕ+ pimN ,mpi/N}.
Bob randomly chooses to measure the observable Oˆ±N or
projects onto one of the basis of the decoy states. They retain
only the copies for which their choice of basis agree, denoted
by the solid blue markers. The probes are also subjected to
possible manipulation by an eavesdropper, Eve, denoted by
regions shaded orange.
The achievable precision on ϕ for each party is
∆ϕ2 ≥ 2/(ν 1−Pa1−PaPcPaPc[N(λM − λm)]2). This is due to
the fact that, Pa fraction of the time Alice sends out a
phase-sensitive state, 1−Pa1−PaPc fraction of the time Bob
measures in the correct basis, Pc fraction of the time
Charlie applies the phase unitary, and and each party
estimates the parameter from only half the remaining
copies of the probe states. This reduction is only a con-
stant factor. For small N the efficiency of the scheme can
be improved by using techniques such as those described
in Ref. [26].
The difference between the two-party protocol de-
scribed above, and one where Alice simply performs the
estimation and encrypts/sends it via quantum key is that
this protocol can be tailored to the scenario where Alice
(or Bob) does not learn the parameter. In the former
protocol, or in any classical protocol this is impossible.
We now examine the multiple party scenario. Alice and
Charlie wish to measure and transmit the parameter to
some trusted parties, but she wants them to uncover the
parameter only when they meet and collaborate, analo-
gously to quantum-secret-sharing schemes [27–32]. Here
Alice is in charge of state preparation and we assume that
ϕ is encoded by Charlie in the channel that separates her
from Bob. If the secret is to be shared among k trusted
parties excluding Alice, she prepares |Φ±N 〉 with probabil-
ity Pa and |Λ0〉 , |Λ1〉 each with probability (1 − Pa)/2,
where
|Φ±N 〉 =
1√
2
(|λm〉⊗N+k−1 ± |λM 〉⊗N+k−1) (8)
and
|Λ0〉 = |λm〉⊗N+k−1 , |Λ1〉 = |λM 〉⊗N+k−1 . (9)
When she prepares |Φ±N 〉, she sends N probes from the
state into the quantum channel to Bob, and one each to
the other k − 1 parties. The state |Φ±N 〉 evolves to
|Φ±N 〉 →
1√
2
(ei(Nϕ+mpi)λm |λm〉⊗N+k−1
±ei(Nϕ+mpi)λM |λM 〉⊗N+k−1). (10)
Now, if every party independently chooses randomly an
observable to measure with probability η, the scheme
would be exponentially inefficient. To overcome this,
they need to first agree on a sequence of measurement
basis in a secure way: Alice can perform a BB84 quan-
tum key distribution separately with each participant.
Then she will share a unique secret bit string with each
of them. She then compares these bit strings, uses one
as a reference and instructs the rest to match theirs to it
by performing a series of bit flip operations. This is a se-
cure step as she is just instructing which bit to flip, never
communicating the bit’s initial or final value. Alterna-
tively, multipartite conference key distribution protocol
can be employed in order to establish a shared secret key
[33].
The parties then agree to project onto the |±〉 bases at
the jth iteration of the protocol if the jth two-bit value
is 0, given Alice will send |ΦN 〉. If the bit value is 1, then
they project onto the computational basis , as Alice will
send |Λ0/1〉. Measuring Oˆ±N+k−1 on |Φ±N 〉 will yield the
outcome ±1.
As Alice sends through the states, they check the out-
comes on the decoys: if the measurements of all k parties
do not match Alice’s preparation, they know an eaves-
dropper is present and they abort the protocol.
The rest of the protocol then follows trivially from
the two-party version. At the end of the protocol
(this stage can be delayed arbitrarily), Alice announces
whether she prepared |Φ+N 〉 or |Φ−N 〉 on half the copies,
and the rest of the parties reveals their respective mea-
surement outcomes on the other half. Alice now pos-
sesses information on all the probes, and can deduce
the parameter by computing the observable OˆN+k−1 =
(|+〉 〈+| − |−〉 〈−|)⊗N+k−1, which has expectation value
cos[(Nϕ + mpi)(λM − λm)]. The precision of her esti-
mate is 2/νPaPc[N(λM−λN )]2. As for the other parties,
they now need to correlate their measurement outcomes
in order to uncover ϕ. They do so by also calculating
〈OˆN/2+k−1〉. Without information from any of the par-
ticipants, the rest of the results are useless, since this
would be equivalent to tracing out one probe from a max-
imally entangled state, which renders the measurement
outcome of the rest completely random. The additional
resources used are of 2kν qubits used for quantum key
distribution and the ν(k − 1) extra probes that do not
interact with Uϕ.
5CONCLUSION
By combining techniques from quantum metrology and
quantum cryptography, we have defined a general frame-
work for quantum cryptographic protocols specifically
suited to the task of securing parameter estimation while
retaining the highest available precision. Adversaries can
gain some information on the parameter, but at the risk
of being detected. We devised protocols for single param-
eter estimation involving an arbitrary number of parties.
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6Supplementary information
For single parameter estimation, Alice prepares the
probe state |Ψ±N 〉 with probability Pa, and the decoy
states {|λ0/1〉} each with equal probability 1−Pa2 .
With probability Pc Charlie applies the phase unitary
Uϕ+mpi/N ,m ∈ {0, ..., N − 1}. The probability of the
respective states that Alice has are:
PaPc : 1/
√
2(ei(Nϕ+mpi)λm |λm〉⊗N
±ei(Nϕ+mpi)λM |λM 〉⊗N )
Pa(1− Pc) : 1/
√
2(|λm〉⊗N ± |λM 〉⊗N )
(1− Pa) : |λ0〉 , |λ1〉 (11)
To maximise security, the decoy states 1/
√
2(|λm〉⊗N±
|λM 〉⊗N ) and |λ0/1〉 need to occur with equal probability.
This means that
Pa(1− Pc) = (1− Pa),→ Pa(2− Pc) = 1. (12)
If Eve wants to minimize her probability of getting
caught while still obtaining some information, her best
strategy would be to try to discriminate which decoy
state Alice has prepared, and send this to Bob. For the
decoy states we have considered, the maximum discrimi-
nation probability is 2/S, where S is the number of sym-
metric states in the set [34].
Eve can achieve this as followed: since she does not
get caught if Alice prepares a probe state, Eve always
makes a guess on the decoy state basis that Alice chose
and performs a von Neumann measurement in that ba-
sis. When a decoy state is prepared, Eve will make an
incorrect guess 1/2 of the time. When she is correct,
the state she sends back to Alice will correlate with Al-
ice’s preparation and Eve is undetected. When Eve is
incorrect, she sends a state in the wrong basis – but half
the time, when Alice performs a measurement, it will
collapse to be what she prepared. Therefore in a one-
party scenario, the probability of Eve’s cheat undetected
is (1− (1−PaPc)4 )κ.
To increase the probability of detecting Eve whilst
keeping the same efficiency η, Alice can use more comple-
mentary bases sets in the decoy state space, for example,
including also
1/
√
2
(
|λm〉⊗N ± i |λM 〉⊗N
)
(13)
in the basis set. In this example, the probability that
Eve will incorrectly guess the basis is now 2/3.
In the two-party protocol, the probability that Bob
receives the states are the same as those in Eq. (11). If
Bob chooses the bases |±〉 and |λ0/1〉 with probability
η, 1 − η respectively, then for the decoy states to occur
with equal probability,
Pa(1− Pc)η = (1− Pa)(1− η) (14)
→ η = 1− Pa
1− PaPc (15)
Now, the probability that Bob has received a decoy
state and measured in the correct basis is given by
Pa(1− Pc)η + (1− Pa)(1− η) = 2(1− Pa)Pa(1− Pc)
(1− PaPc) .
(16)
The probability of Eve successfully evading detection
would be 1/4, when this occurs, therefore if Eve tam-
pers with κ probes, the probability is given by(
1− 2(1− Pa)Pa(1− Pc)
4(1− PaPc)
)κ
. (17)
